Contractual Limitation of Bailee\u27s Liability in Illinois by Brodkey, Edward
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 8 
Issue 1 Fall-Winter 1958 Article 3 
Contractual Limitation of Bailee's Liability in Illinois 
Edward Brodkey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Edward Brodkey, Contractual Limitation of Bailee's Liability in Illinois, 8 DePaul L. Rev. 25 (1958) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol8/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CONTRACTUAL LIMITATION OF BAILEE'S
LIABILITY IN ILLINOIS
EDWARD BRODKEY
" ?nia balia divisa est in partes.*
I
ODAY, tomorrow and the next day, people will continue to de-
liver millions of dollars' worth of their goods into the hands of
other persons for various purposes' and, inevitably, important
disputes will continue to arise as to liability for loss or damage there-
to. This will be so even if the teaching of Bailments, qua bailments, is
abolished in every law school curriculum 2 and on every bar examina-
tion3 in the land. It is clear that you cannot abolish the factual situa-
tions or the need to resolve the problems involved, one of the most
oft-recurring of these being contractual limitation of bailees' liability.4
We have labored too long under the delusion that the law on that
subject is incapable of clarification 5 or that no good or useful purpose
is served by recognition of definite rules and standards to apply in
*With apologies to both Caesar and Judge Story.
The legal possession of goods by one who is not their owner is one of the best ac-
cepted concepts of bailment. See Williston on Contracts S 1032 where the author rejects
the old definitions of bailment as a contractual relationship in favor of the definition
of a bailment as "a rightful possession of goods by one who is not the owner."
2 If, indeed, that has not already been accomplished.
3 It is interesting to note that the following question, apropos this article, appeared
on an Illinois bar examination: "A is in the business of processing and packaging frozen
foods. As an accommodation to his friends he frequently permits them to store frozen
meats and vegetables in his 'cold room,' without charge. In some cases he makes a charge
for the storage services. He now consults you, inquiring as to his liability with respect
to the property left in his possession. He also wishes to know whether a sign in his place
of business, reading 'Not responsible for loss by fire or theft,' would protect him from
any loss occasioned by such means. Advise him. Explain."
4 Ins. Co. of North America v. Elgin, J.&E. R. Co., 229 F.2d 705 (C.A. 7th, 1956); U.S.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Paramount Fur Service, 145 N.E.2d 844 (Ohio, 1957).
-5 175 A.L.R. 117 (1948).
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repetitive situations. One court" has even stated that "treatise writers
display a marked tendency to generalize about bailments and their
ideas are apt to reproduce themselves for application in undiscriminat-
ing factual situations." Be that as it may, it is high time someone had
the courage to try to help out Lord Holt, who said, more than 250
years ago, "I have said thus much in this case, because it is of great
consequence, that the law should be settled in this point, but I don't
know whether I may have settled it, or may not rather have unsettled
it. But however that happen, I have stirred these points, which wiser
heads in time may settle. .... ,,7
II
At the outset, it will help to state the problem: There seems to be a
marked difference of opinion among bench, bar, doctor and student
as to whether or not a bailee may contract to exempt himself from all
liability for care of his bailor's goods against their loss, theft or damage
due to the bailee's negligence." The precise question has never been
settled in Illinois,9 but the position which the Illinois courts would
probably take were the issue squarely presented to them for determi-
nation seems apparent from the cases thus far decided,'" and certainly
there is little doubt as to what their decision ought to be.
Much confusion has arisen from the tendency of many courts to
predicate their attempts to decide the point on a determination of
whether or not the means employed to accomplish the end, in the
particular case, were sufficient to do so," which is a contracts ques-
tion, rather than on whether or not the law permits such limitations
or exemptions. Further, it is common to find courts holding that a
6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, speaking through Fin-
negan, J., in St. Paul Fire & M. Ins. Co. v. Chicago Union Station Co., 253 F.2d 441, 443
(C.A. 7th, 1958).
7 Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909 (K.B., 1703).
s Noyes v. Hines, 220 I11. App. 409 (1920); Millers Mut'l Fire Ins. Assn. v. Parker, 234
N.C. 20, 65 S.E. 2d 341 (1951); Brown on Personal Property § 84.
9 Schoen v. Vallace, 334 Ill. App. 294, 78 N.E. 2d 801 (1948).
10 French Republic v. World's Columbian Exposition, 83 Fed. 109 (N.D. Ill., 1897),
rev'd 91 Fed. 64 (C.A. 7th, 1898); Schoen v. Wallace, 334 Ill. App. 294, 78 N.E. 2d 801
(1948); Krupp v. National Fur Dressing & Dyeing Co., 250 IIl. App. 282 (1928); Jacobs
v. Grossman, 310 IlI. 247, 141 N.E. 714 (1923); Shayne v. Krebs, 55 11. App. 238 (1894).
11 Ohge v. La Salle-Randolph Garage, 328 I11. App. 665, 66 N.E. 2d 725 (1946); Noyes
v. Hines, 220 Il. App. 409 (1920); Wiley v. Childs Co., 211 Ill. App. 496 (1918); Healy
v. New York Central & H. River R. Co., 153 App. Div. 516, 138 N.Y. Supp. 287 (1912);
Vogelsang v. Fredkyn, 133 Il. App. 356 (1907).
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bailee may limit his liability, but not as against his negligence, asserting
that to so do would contravene public policy.'2 Again, one finds deci-
sions indicating that while a bailee may limit his said liability by con-
tract, providing the limitation and notice thereof are reasonable, 3 he
may not completely exempt himself from such liability.
14
It seems obvious that if the law is that an ordinary bailee is liable
for his care of the bailor's goods only if he is negligent, as was held in
Coggs v. Bernard,'5 and if the courts are prepared to say that he may
limit his liability at all, such limitation can be only as against his negli-
gence. Only in cases of the extraordinary bailments, such as common
carriers and innkeepers, is the bailee held liable whether or not he is
negligent.1l In these latter cases, it is logical to say that there is some-
thing besides his negligence against which a bailee may contract, but
such is not the case where the only basis for impressing liability upon
the bailee is his negligence.' 7
Similarly, it is difficult to appreciate why or how every attempt by
a bailee to limit his liability in advance opposes public policy. As to
the bailor himself, the maxim applicable in torts volenti non fit injuria
is well known and widely applied.' 8 As to the public, "public policy"
is a relative term. All private acts of individuals may somehow in-
directly affect everyone else, but for present purposes we should be
influenced only by the probability of a fairly certain and direct reac-
tion on such matters as public finance, manpower, corruption in
office, health, morals or the like. To suggest that recognition of a
bailee's right so to limit his liability would, without more, tend to en-
courage bailees to be careless is unrealistic and so highly conjectural
and remote as to pose no real problem. After all, a bailor generally has
freedom of choice to seek out and traffic with the most diligent bailee.
On the other hand, such recognition would foster freedom of con-
12 Sporsem v. First Nat'l Bank, 133 Wash. 199, 233 Pac. 641 (1925); Thompson v.
Mobile Light & Ry. Co., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177 (1924); Denver Union Terminal Co.
v. Cullinan, 72 Colo. 248, 210 Pac. 602 (1922); Healy v. New York Central & H. River
R. Co., 153 App. Div. 516, 138 N.Y. Supp. 287 (1912).
13 Noyes v. Hines, 220 Ill. App. 409 (1920).
14 Silvestri v. South Orange Storage Corp., 14 N.J. Super. 205, 81 A.2d 502, 504 (1951).
15 2 Ld. Raym. 909 (K.B., 1703).
16 Ibid., at 918.
17 Wells v. The Steam Navigation Co., 8 N.Y. 204 (1846).
18 See Willis, The Right of Bailees to Contract Against Liability for Negligence, 20
Harv. L. Rev. 297, 302 (1906).
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tract' 9 And in those instances where public policy is directly and
appreciably involved, the law has already specially classified such bail-
ments, imposed extraordinary liability on the bailees in certain cases
and in most instances has subjected them to regulation.2 ° Historically,
the courts have stated only that a bailee may not limit his liability by
contract against his "gross negligence," which is something akin to
wilfullness, wantonness or affirmative act and essentially different
from "negligence" as such.2'
Those decisions that hold that a bailee may limit his liability by con-
tract but may not completely relieve or exempt himself from that
liability lose sight of the fact that in so doing they permit the bailee to
contract to be careless up to a certain point but not beyond. It is sub-
mitted that if it is immoral or otherwise opposed to public policy to
allow a bailee to contract in advance for a condition that will permit
him to be careless, it is scarcely less so to permit him so to contract
within limitations as to amount, nature of casualty or other special
circumstance. Beyond this we ask: "What is a reasonable limitation 22
or how close to complete exemption may such bailee be allowed to
contract?" The difference between limitation and exemption is only
one of degree.
In those cases where the courts have held that a bailee may limit his
liability but not as against his negligence, they have mistakenly and
blindly followed supposed authority. 28 In many if not most instances
they accidentally came to the right conclusion, but for the wrong
reasons. The cases in question were predominantly ones involving
common carriers or other bailees affected with a public interest.2 4 It
would have been just as easy for the courts to have correctly an-
nounced the applicable rule as prohibiting a bailee from contracting
to limit his liability as against his negligence where public policy is
involved.
19 Ibid., at 299.
20Davies v. Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1943); Tyson v. Banton, 273
U.S. 418 (1926).
21 3 R.C.L. 106, § 30 n 2 and cases there cited; Interstate Compress Co. v. Agnew, 276
Fed. 882 (C.A. 8th, 1921); also see Willis, The Right of Bailees to Contract Against
Liability for Negligence, 20 Harv. L. Rev. 297 (1907).
22 Noyes v. Hines, 220 Ill. App. 409, 421 (1920).
23 Denver Union Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cullinan, 72 Colo. 248, 210 Pac. 602 (1922).
2 4 Lebkeucher v. Penn. R. Co., 97 N.J.L. 112, 116 Atl. 323 (1922); Gesford v. Star Van
& Storage Co., 104 Neb. 453, 177 N.W. 794 (1920); Hotels Statler Co. v. Safier, 103 Ohio
St. 638, 134 N.E. 460 (1921); Dodge v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 142 Tenn. 20, 215
S.W. 274 (1919).
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III
In Illinois, there are no decided cases directly in point.25 The de-
cision most often used to illustrate the principle involved is French
Republic v. World's Columbian Exposition.6 There the Republic of
France sued the 1893 world's fair association in the United States Cir-
cuit (District) Court for the loss of valuable paintings exhibited at
the exposition and destroyed by fire after its close. The rule book
issued by the fair authorities and seen by the exhibitor provided for
exemption from bailee's liability. In his opinion, Judge Grosscup
said:
The first question is what effect is to be given to these immunity clauses?
Were the Exposition a common carrier or warehouseman, such an effort to
exempt itself from liability would not, under the best line of adjudications, be
extended to injuries resulting from its own positive negligence. Public policy
forbids giving effect to stipulations against liability for injuries resulting from
want of ordinary care. Cooley, Torts, paragraph 685, and cased cited in note. 27
Then the learned Judge went on, for two pages of his reported opin-
281ion, to point out that the relation in this case was in many respects
different from the ordinary private transactions that constitute the
usual bailment. He proceeded to paint a picture of the extent to
which the public interest was affected by the loss of the painting, and
concluded:
I hold, therefore, as the law of this case, that the management of the Exposi-
tion was under legal obligations to safeguard, by the highest intelligence and
protection compatible with the ephemeral character of the buildings, the ex-
hibits of the plaintiffs, the French Republic and the French citizens, and that
such obligation is not escaped by the exempting clauses contained in the regu-
lations promulgated by the director general. 29
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court 30 and held that
the world's fair was not "an insurer of the exhibit," nor was it negli-
gent under the facts of the case. Accordingly, Mr. Justice Woods, in
a special concurring opinion, said:
Regardless of "the exempting clauses contained in the regulations promul-
gated by the director general," I think it cannot be true, as declared in the
opinion below, that "nothing short of exhaustive carefulness, all the circum-
25 Schoen v. Wallace, 334 Ill. App. 294, 78 N.E.2d 801 (1948).
2683 Fed. 109 (N.D. Ill., 1897).
27 Ibid., at 112.
28 Ibid., at 112, 113.
29 Ibid., at 113. 3091 Fed. 64 (C.A. 7th, 1898).
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stances considered," could "fully meet the moral and legal obligations im-
posed," or that it is "the law of this case that the management of the exposition
was under legal obligations to' safeguard, by the highest intelligence and pro-
tection compatible with the ephemeral character of the buildings, the exhibits
of the plaintiff." At most, the plaintiff in error was bound, I think, to exercise
ordinary care .... 31
As the Court of Appeals rejected the finding of the trial judge that
this bailment was so affected with public interest that extraordinary
liability should be imposed upon the bailee and failed to find the bailee
negligent, there was no occasion for it to pass upon the effect of the
immunity clauses, and it accordingly did not do so. Moreover, this
was a Federal case, and although it was decided in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois, it is not Illinois law. 2 One should bear in mind only
that the trial judge, in effect, found it necessary to distinguish between
ordinary bailments and those affected with a public interest. Only
with respect to the latter sort, such as a "common carrier or ware-
houseman" was the court constrained to say that the immunity clauses
could not exempt the bailee from liability and then only against "its
own positive negligence" under the "best line of adjudications."13
In Scboen v. Wallace, which wa a suit by the bailor of a mink
fur coat against the bailee furrier who lost it, the furrier having lim-
ited his liability to $100 by contract with the customer, the court said:
The basic question presented for determination is the validity of the agree-
ment between the parties limiting defendant bailee's liability to $100. The pre-
cise question here involved has not been passed upon by our Supreme Court.
Plaintiff maintains that a contract between a bailor and bailee to relieve the
bailee of liability for his own negligence or fraud is contrary to public policy.
I.. in Jacobs v. Grossman, 310 111. 247, 250, the court said: "Whatever may be
the rights of the parties in bailment for the mutual benefit of the bailor and
bailee, it is unquestionably the law that the parties may increase or diminish
these rights by stipulations contained in the contract of bailment....
Plaintiff argues that if the validity of the agreement in the present case is
sustained furriers would be encouraged either to convert garments in their
custody to their own use or would be induced to exercise minimum care.
Plaintiff did business with the defendant over the years because she "felt he
31 Ibid., at 77.
32 It is interesting to note that the Illinois Bar Examiners included a question on a
recent bar examination covering the loss of a handmade bedspread exhibited at a
county fair which may have been guilty of negligence in guarding same, but relied on
a similar immunity clause. This would seem to have been based on the decision in Kay
County Free Fair Ass'n v. Martin, 190 Oki. 106, 122 P.2d 393 (1942), in which the
court held that the defendant was required to use ordinary care regardless of any rule
of non-liability prescribed in its catalog. See 139 A.L.R. 928, 935. How should the
question have been answered?
3383 Fed. 109, 112 (N.D. Ill., 1897).
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was reliable." She was free to buy a mink coat from any furrier in the city but
she chose to do business with the defendant. It was a private transaction in
which the public was in no way concerned. Nor is it a matter of public inter-
est whether the loss shall be borne by the plaintiff's insurer or by the defend-
ant. . . .While the facts in the cases last cited are dissimilar to those in the
case at bar we think the principle emerging from these cases is applicable here,
which permits the parties in a bailment to relieve or limit the bailee's liability
for his own negligence.34
It will thus be seen from the foregoing that the Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District has recognized the principle that where
the bailment is essentially a private transaction and not a matter of
public interest, a bailee may by contract either "relieve" or "limit"
his liability "for his own negligence." Whether the court, by the use
of the term "relieve," meant something different from "limit," namely
to "exempt," is not clear. The word "relieve" is a relative term 5 and
one of many connotations depending upon the sense in which used
and all the surrounding circumstances.
IV
Yet it is clearly of no assistance to a complete understanding of the
law applicable to prophesy that the Illinois courts would probably
follow the rule which permits a bailee to excuse himself from all
liability as against his negligence unless the bailment is affected with
a public interest. As has been so often noted, it is not the recognition
of the rule which presents the difficulty, but its application. 36 It is not
enough to quote the rule unless we know what the Illinois courts are
likely to regard as bailments affected with such public interest.
As pointed out by David R. Levin in a recent monograph published
in the Chicago-Kent Law Review, 37 off-street automobile parking
facilities could easily qualify as public utilities. Various courts, with-
out attempting to classify them as public utilities, have stated that
they affect public interest.3 8 On the other hand the Supreme Court of
the United States has held that the public interest in a business is not
to be determined solely by the number of people it serves.39 Among
other factors to be taken into account are the monopolistic character-
34 334 Ill. App. 294, 296, 297 and 298, 78 N.E.2d 801, 802, 803 (1948).
35 Cf. D.D.D. Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 125 F.2d 679 (C.A. 7th, 1942).
36 McNicholas v. New England T. & T. Co., 196 Mass. 138, 81 N.E. 889 (1907).
37 Levin, Parking Facilities as Public Utilities, 29 Chicago-Kent L. R. 295 (1951).
38 Miller's Mut'l. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20, 65 S.E. 2d 341 (1951).
39 Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 430 (1926).
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istics of the business in question,40 and particularly the comparative
bargaining power of the parties. 41 Accordingly, it has been held proper
to regulate not only the storage of grain in Chicago, as decided in
Munn v. Illinois,42 but also the rates and charges made by insurance
companies,4" since the court felt that these operations were affected
with a public interest. On the other hand, the Supreme Court refused
to consider the rates charged by theater ticket speculators a matter of
public concern.44 And with respect to the effect of the distribution
of insurance losses on the public, the Illinois court, in Schoen v.
Wallace, supra, did not hesitate to observe that it is not "a matter of
public interest whether the loss shall be borne by the plaintiff's insurer
or by the defendant. ' 45
Again, with respect to parcel check rooms which issue claim checks
to owners leaving their baggage, it would appear that these establish-
ments are at least as much affected with a public interest on account
of their widespread need and use, monopolistic tendencies and ine-
quality of bargaining power of bailor and bailee as is the case with
respect to automobile parking lots. If both the operators of parking
facilities and parcel check rooms are to be classified for this purpose
as public type bailees (an extremely unlikely position), neither of
them, under this view, should be able to contract against their liability.
Yet, despite the fact that both a Connecticut court46 and a Texas
court4 7 have reasoned that neither a claim check nor a sign disclaiming
bailee's liability (nor even their combination) will operate to exon-
erate the bailee, the Illinois court in Noyes v. Hines48 held that the
combination of a conspicuous sign directing the bailor's attention to
the contract set out on his claim check will effect the limitation in
question. The Texas court said:
We do not undertake to suggest what the method [of limiting liability]
should be except that information as to the hour of closing and the time of
40 Davies Warehouse Co. v. Brown, 137 F.2d 201 (U.S. Emergency Ct. of Appeals,
1943).
41 St. Paul Fire & M. Ins. Co. v. Chicago Union Station Co., 253 F.2d 441 (C.A. 7th,
1958); Miller's Mut'l. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20, 65 S.E.2d 341 (1951).
4294 U.S. 113 (1876).
43 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1913).
44 Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1926).
45 334 111. App. 294, 78 N.E.2d 801 (1948).
46 Malone v. Santora, Johnson v. Santora, 135 Conn. 286, 64 A.2d 51 (1949).
47 McAshan v. Cavitt, 149 Tex. 147, 229 S.W.2d 1016 (1950).
48 220 111. App. 409 (1920).
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the ending of responsibility for care of the automobile should be clearly and
specifically brought to the attention of the bailor [car owner]. 49
The Illinois court reasoned:
What more could or ought the defendant to have done in order to put
plaintiff upon notice? Large placards, so situated that one exercising any de-
gree of care could scarcely fail to see them, announced to the plaintiff these
limitations. The ticket which was handed to him sepecifically pointed them
out. What more could defendant have dane, or what more ought we require
it to do? Should the defendant be required to instruct every one of its servants
to personally notify each one of its customers by word of mouth, of that
which it had already notified him in writing? We do not think so.50
If the question put by the Illinois court above be not entirely rhetori-
cal, it might well admit of an affirmative rather than a negative answer,
within the bounds of reason. More important, this Illinois decision
would seem to indicate a more liberal tendency in Illinois than in
certain other states with respect to allowing a bailee to limit his lia-
bility by contract in the easiest and most practicable manner. And
while we fully recognize that the court's immediate concern was with
the means employed to bring about the consensual realtion and the
contract, it is arguable that courts would not waste their time in an
effort to determine whether or not the contract of limitation were
effected unless they also believed it might accomplish a permissible
limitation. In any event, it seems fairly certain that the Illinois courts
do not mean to intimate that bailees such as parking lots and check
rooms cannot limit their liability by contract.
V
One thing seems certain: "Omnia bailia divisa est in partes duos."
There are two classes of bailments. One class of bailees are generally
allowed to limit their liability for negligence and a second class are
not. If the bailment is essentially private in nature, so that no other
than the bailor and bailee are directly and materially affected by the
limitation, it is permitted. On the other hand, if third parties are im-
mediately affected, such a limitation is regarded as against public
policy and void. So far there is substantial agreement. It has been
suggested, however, that all bailees are divisible for this purpose into
"ordinary" bailees and "professional" bailees,51 the former group of
49 McAshan v. Cavitt, 149 Tex. 147, 229 S.W.2d 1016 (1950).
50 Noyes v. Hines, 220 Ill. App. 409, 422 (1920).
51 Ins. Co. of N. America v. E. J. & E. Ry. Co., 220 F.2d 705 (C.A. 7th, 1956).
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which may, while the latter group may not, limit their liability by
contract. Although one cannot deny to any man the right to make
his own definitions and his own classifications, the writer finds little
or no basis for the classification last suggested. The United States
Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit adopted the "ordinary" as
opposed to "professional" classification simply because the generaliz-
ing "treatise writers" of the A.L.R. article cited in the opinion had
made that classification.
If by the term "professional" bailees we are to understand that
bailees who make bailment their business may not relieve themselves
from liability by contract, it cannot be denied that both a railroad
and a furrier are professionals, and such Illinois cases as we have here
cited are against that position.52 They seemingly distinguish between
"private" and "public" type bailees, rather than between "ordinary"
and "professional." If "ordinary" bailees must be contrasted with any
other type, we think the Illinois courts were thinking of "extraor-
dinary" bailments, such as common carriers, innkeepers and perhaps
warehousemen, 53 who must take all comers. It would seem that any
bailee who need not accept the bailment at all, may generally con-
dition his acceptance on any terms he chooses. The only time there
is true disparity of bargaining power between bailor and bailee is
when either the bailor or bailee has no real choice. It is submitted that
a bailor is not deprived of a choice just because his bailee is a business
man. And it is noteworthy that Illinois, like many other states, even
permits certain extraordinary bailees to limit their liability by con-
tract, in the absence of prohibiting statute. Frequently, the only
inquiries are whether there was real assent to the arrangement and
consideration for the reduction in liability. 4
VI
The small number of decided cases in Illinois makes it difficult to
prognosticate with any degree of certainty as to what the Illinois
courts would hold should new situations arise. Nevertheless, it is be-
lieved that the following positions would be taken:
52 Both the furrier in Schoen v. Wallace, 334 I11. App. 294, 78 N.E. 2d 801 (1948), and
the check room proprieter in Noyes v. Hines, 220 I11. App. 409 (1920) were "profes-
sionals" in that sense.
. a Cf. French Republic v. World's Columbian Exposition, 83 Fed. 109 (N.D. Ill.,
1897), rev'd 91 Fed. 64 (C.A. 7th, 1898).
54 Noyes v. Hines, 220 Ill. App. 409 (1920).
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(1) They would not hold that an ordinary bailee may not contract
against his negligence, but would permit him to do so (a) within
reasonable limitations, with reasonable notice, or perhaps (b) entirely,
if it appear that the bailor knew and assented to the exemption.
(2) They would prohibit a bailee in a bailment affected with pub-
lic interest from contracting against his negligence, but would not
regard all attempts of bailees to limit by contract their liability as
against their negligence ipso facto against public policy. It would
depend on the individual situation.
(3) In classifying certain bailments as so affected with public pol-
icy as to preclude a bailee's contract against his negligence, they
would require clear, direct, and certain evidence of the public rather
than the private nature of bailee's business in order to rebut a pre-
sumption that, without more, bailees are engaged in private enterprise,
and would tend liberally to construe the requirement to allow the
utmost freedom of contract.
(4) In determining the efficacy of the means employed to effect
the contractual arrangement, they would not require the unusual, the
unnatural or the impossible.
